The Battle for Aleppo - ISW Report

Elizabeth O'Bagy | Institute for the Study of War |The Syrian regime has launched an offensive in the northern province of Aleppo. This operation follows shortly after the regime victory at al-Qusayr in Homs province, where Hezbollah forces and National Defense Forces played key roles. Along with key regime units, these forces have redeployed to Aleppo in support of this operation, indicating its strategic significance to Assad. A regime victory at Minnakh Airbase, north of Aleppo city, would secure regime resupply to forces clearing the countryside north of Aleppo city, threatening the opposition presence in the province and isolating opposition strongholds in Idlib and al Raqqa.

On the heels of its success in al-Qusayr, the Syrian government launched a new offensive against rebel-held areas in Aleppo province, marked by the deployment of thousands of Lebanese Hezbollah militants on June 2.[1] Focusing on strategic targets in northern Aleppo province, government forces have reinforced their defenses at Minnakh Airbase, and started to deploy on a large scale in the surrounding countryside. The swift advance toward Aleppo comes in lieu of regime force consolidation in positions surrounding al-Qusayr in Homs province, suggesting that the Syrian government believes its potential for success against a reeling rebel force in the contested environs of Aleppo city outweighs the dangers of losing some of the ground recently gained in al-Qusayr.

 

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad likely perceives the current momentum shift in his favor as an opportunity to deal a lethal blow to the opposition. Furthermore, he likely seeks to defeat the armed opposition militarily before they can be armed by Western powers. Given that rebel positions in Aleppo province are not operationally oriented to counter a regime ground campaign, and that the Syrian Military has been revitalized by Hezbollah’s overt involvement in the conflict, it is not beyond reason for the Syrian government to think that a primary offensive could lead to results similar to those seen in al-Qusayr. However, despite its impressive military gains in recent weeks, the Syrian government does not have the forces required to simultaneously retake all rebel-held areas of the country, and there are limits to the amount of reinforcements that Hezbollah can provide. This suggests not only that the regime will struggle to achieve a level of success in Aleppo, but also that it will risk losing territory gained in recent offensives. The regime faces the risk that its campaign may culminate before it reaches its operational and strategic objectives.

 

 

The Syrian government is employing a familiar strategy in the potential battle for northern Aleppo, called Operation Northern Storm.[2] This strategy proved successful in the battles for Wadi al-Deif and Maarat al-Numan leading up to its victory in al-Qusayr. At the Wadi al-Deif Airbase, next to the city of Maarat al-Numan in Idlib province, regime military forces broke a significant rebel siege and were able to re-establish an important strategic presence before attempting to retake the rebel-controlled town of Maarat al-Numan.[3] Once in control of Maarat al-Numan, government forces were then able to re-open critical ground supply lines which allowed for the redirection of airpower and an expansion of its air campaign over Homs province prior to its advance on al-Qusayr. A similar operation is now underway at Minnakh Airbase, where government reinforcements have been flown to help break through the rebel siege, and clearance operations are occurring in the villages located along the highway leading into Minnakh. If the regime is able to break the siege at Minnakh, it will be able to push south to consolidate its control of the highway leading into Aleppo city, thereby cutting off an important supply line for the opposition. This will set the stage for a potential siege of Aleppo city as government troops are able to advance on the city from both the south and the north.

 

Another regime practice that it has executed elsewhere centers on preparatory operations to clear the towns and villages surrounding a principal objective. In al-Qusayr, government troops led by Hezbollah guerilla forces first cleared adjacent towns, such as Shamsin and Shinsar. Once in control of these towns, the government proceeded to conduct preparatory bombardment of al-Qusayr before sending in Hezbollah irregular forces, followed by Syrian government infantry troops. This strategy included driving rebel forces inward to compress their ranks and then isolating them to prevent rebel reinforcement or resupply. The combination of these attacks proved insurmountable, and the rebels were forced to retreat out of al-Qusayr. The early stages of the government’s offensive in Aleppo share these same characteristics, as government forces are focusing on control of the airbases and supply lines while simultaneously clearing surrounding towns, particularly Nebul and Zahra.[4]  Both towns are predominantly Shi‘i and have been heavily contested between opposition and government forces, much like the villages to the southwest of al-Qusayr. Neither side has demonstrated a clear advantage as of yet, making the results of these specific clashes highly pertinent to the upcoming offensive against Aleppo city. 

 

The towns of Nebul and Zahra are significant for three reasons. First, if the towns were to come under complete government control, they could serve as important staging grounds for attacks against Aleppo city. The regime could consolidate its positions around Aleppo before launching an intensive ground campaign. This was a successful approach in the siege of al-Qusayr, as the regime cleared and gained control of towns neighboring al-Qusayr leading up to the siege, providing them a base of support from which to launch attacks. Second, the towns are strategically located along the highway between Aleppo and Minnakh Airbase that leads to Turkey. This highway has been used as an important resupply route for rebels fighting in Aleppo city. If government forces took control of the surrounding towns, they would be able to isolate and besiege rebel forces operating in Aleppo city. Again, similar tactics were used by the government in the battles for al-Qusayr and Wadi al-Deif, with rebels losing key highway checkpoints in the days leading up to their retreat. Third, government control of the towns would help solidify its control of Minnakh Airbase, from which the Syrian Air Force can launch air raids against rebel positions both within Aleppo city and in the surrounding countryside.

Nebul and Zahra have been defended for the last few months by Popular Defense Committees, militia units composed of minorities who have armed themselves to protect their communities against opposition fighters. These committees are directly supported by the government and Iran.[5] Though these predominantly Shi‘a Popular Defense Committees operating in the area had initially agreed to a truce with rebel forces, the ceasefire failed on April 3rd and clashes have occurred regularly since that time.[6] Despite additional ceasefires attempts, the regime has largely been able to disrupt attempts at mediation between the two communities. To this end, the Popular Defense Committees have served as an important irregular force on behalf the Syrian government, and thus far they have largely cooperated with the regime on its recent offensive.   

 

In addition to the local Popular Defense Committees, thousands of Alawites belonging to pro-government paramilitary troops are being sent to Aleppo. These Alawi fighters function similarly to the Popular Defense Committees, forming militia-like units within the government’s newly created National Defense Force (NDF). The Syrian government is also relying extensively on support from Hezbollah forces for operations in Aleppo. According to rebels from Aleppo’s Tawhid Brigade, Hezbollah fighters are amassing around the two strategic towns of Anadan and Harithan that could be used to launch the government’s campaign to retake much of the rebel-held areas in Aleppo.[7]  One Hezbollah commander acknowledged that there were at least 2,000 Hezbollah fighters in Aleppo province in preparation for an attack on Aleppo city, which he claimed has already begun on small scale.[8] While the combined effects of these reinforcements have sustained the government’s campaign so far, there are growing signs of strain, particularly for the Hezbollah units involved which have already suffered more casualties than expected and have been forced to change their rotation patterns. Hezbollah also faces growing domestic pressure over their role in Syria.[9] Whether they will be able to sustain such a high-level of involvement in Syria is debatable in light of their political position and resource limitations. Thus, it could be argued that the government has pushed on the offensive in Aleppo rather than consolidating in Homs because they recognize that there is a certain time limit to the all-out support it is receiving from Hezbollah.  

 

Another prominent factor in the unfolding situation has been the role of local Kurdish groups around Aleppo. Relations have been tense between rebel groups and local Kurdish groups that maintain control of Sheikh Maqsoud, a neighborhood in northern Aleppo. Additionally, there has been a notable increase in the amount of violence between the Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG) and rebel forces northwest of Aleppo, in the Ifreen area. Reports from Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) show significant YPG-Rebel clashes beginning on June 6th, the day after al-Qusayr fell under government control. Clashes have continued throughout the Ifreen area, as YPG forces have taken numerous villages along the main ground line of communication leading from Aleppo city into Turkey, and have also seized a number of connecting roads.[10] The YPG appears to be defending and consolidating its territory. At the same time, YPG clashes with regime forces have been noticeably absent. In fact, regime and YPG agendas appear to be aligning with Kurdish elements reportedly cooperating with regime forces to protect their territory and evict the rebels from the area.[11]  YPG forces have been largely successful in seizing temporarily rebel-held territory, and they serve as another obstacle to opposition control along the Turkey-Aleppo line of communication. Overall, tense relations between the Arab and Kurdish armed groups have proven a considerable weakness for the opposition, and one that the regime will look to exploit further as it advances on Aleppo city.

 

The recent surge in activity in strategic locations around Aleppo has shown the regime’s willingness to shift its attention away from its recent victory in al-Qusayr, and instead to focus on a battle for northern Aleppo. The rebels’ main supply line from Turkey flows into Aleppo, and then extends throughout the rest of northern and central Syria. The loss of the Turkey-Aleppo supply line would likely cripple rebel ability to contest areas throughout the Aleppo and Idlib provinces and further south into central Syria. It would also serve to further fragment the opposition movement, as rebel groups would no longer control a geographically linked territory from the east to the west, across Raqqa, Aleppo, and Idlib provinces. With rebel groups bogged down in Aleppo city and others isolated in positions to the west in Idlib province and to the east in pocketed strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zour provinces, it is highly doubtful that opposition forces would be able to mount any offensive capabilities against the government. While fighting would continue, rebels would likely be forced to revert back to guerrilla tactics rather than attempting to hold territory.

 

Although the recent gains made by the Syrian government are likely to diminish overtime, at the present time, momentum is clearly in the government’s favor. As the Syrian opposition faces new incursions by pro-government forces, including Hezbollah and other Iranian-sponsored militants, discussions to aid the opposition have taken on added urgency. Given the backing of Assad’s allies, it is unlikely that the opposition will be able to defend Aleppo without external support. On June 12, Free Syrian Army leader General Salim Idriss requested lethal support to the opposition in a pressing letter to the White House, stating that they “cannot hold on to Aleppo without these weapons.”[12]  As the Obama Administration has declared that the Assad regime has crossed a "red line" in the usage of chemical weapons in Syria, a decision has been taken to begin supplying opposition groups with lethal aid in the form of small arms and ammunition, as well as possibly anti-tank weaponry.[13] A decision to supply rebels with anti-aircraft weapons has so far been declined. Whether this provision of aid will be sufficient to slow or reverse regime advances remains to be seen.

 

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[1] Loveday Morris, “In Syria, Hezbollah forces appear ready to attack rebels in city of Aleppo,” Washington Post, June 2, 2013.

[2] Alexander Besant, “Operation Northern Storm: Syrian army plans assault on Aleppo,” Global Post, June 10, 2013.

[3] Jonathan Dupree, “ Syria Update: Regime Breaks Siege at Wadi al-Deif,” Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, April 18, 2013.

[4] “Rebel fighters bombarded with rockets the Nubul and al-Zahra' towns,” SOHR, June 12, 2013

[5] Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2013.

[6]Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook Page, April 3, 2013,  https://www.facebook.com/syriaohr.

[7] Julian Barnes and Adam Entous, “Rebels plead for weapons in face of Syrian onslaught,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2013.

[8] Morris, “In Syria, Hezbollah forces appear ready to attack rebels in city of Aleppo.”

[9] Morris, “For Lebanon’s Sunnis, growing rage at Hezbollah over role in Syria,” Washington Post, June 12, 2013.

[10]  Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 6-12, 2013.

[11]  Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 6, 2013.

[12] Julian Barnes and Adam Entous, “Rebels plead for weapons in face of Syrian onslaught,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2013.

[13] Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon, and Mark Landler, “U.S. is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, June 13, 2013,  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons.html?.

Wednesday Hero - GySgt. John Basilon

This Post Was Suggested By Michael

GySgt. John Basilone 21 years old from Raritan, New Jersey Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Marine Regiment, 5th Marine Division November 4, 1916 - February 19, 1945



For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action against enemy Japanese forces, above and beyond the call of duty, while serving with the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division in the Lunga Area, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on 24 and 25 October 1942. While the enemy was hammering at the Marines' defensive positions, Sgt. Basilone, in charge of 2 sections of heavy machine guns, fought valiantly to check the savage and determined assault. In a fierce frontal attack with the Japanese blasting his guns with grenades and mortar fire, one of Sgt. Basilone's sections, with its gun crews, was put out of action, leaving only 2 men able to carry on. Moving an extra gun into position, he placed it in action, then, under continual fire, repaired another and personally manned it, gallantly holding his line until replacements arrived. A little later, with ammunition critically low and the supply lines cut off, Sgt. Basilone, at great risk of his life and in the face of continued enemy attack, battled his way through hostile lines with urgently needed shells for his gunners, thereby contributing in large measure to the virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment. His great personal valor and courageous initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

GySgt. Basilone was killed helping to guide a tank to safety that was trapped in a mine field under heavy mortar and artillery barrages during the invasion of Iwo Jima.

You can read more about GySgt. Basilone and his amazing bravery here

These brave men and women sacrifice so much in their lives just so others may get to enjoy freedom. For that I am proud to call them Hero.

Those Who Say That We're In A Time When There Are No Heroes, They Just Don't Know Where To Look

This post is part of the Wednesday Hero Blogroll. For more information about Wednesday Hero, or if you would like to post it on your site, you can go here.

Syria Update 13-09: The Fall of al-Qusayr

Elizabeth O'Bagy | Institute for the Study of War |

 

With the help of thousands of fighters from Hezbollah, Iran, and Iraq, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has achieved one of his most important military victories in the past two years by forcing the withdrawal of opposition forces from the town of al-Qusayr. The town is located in Homs province, an area central to the success of Assad’s overall military strategy. It is located along the southern route from Damascus through Homs province to the coast, at a juncture where regime forces have struggled to maintain their grasp. Rebel control of al-Qusayr had disrupted the regime’s critical ground line of supply from Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and allowed for the cross-border movement of arms to rebels. Control of al-Qusayr now secures the regime’s line of communication from Damascus to the coast. Al-Qusayr now also cuts off access to cross-border weapons supplies to the rebels from Lebanon and provides an important staging ground for future efforts by the regime to retake the north and east. 

 

The regime launched a major offensive against al-Qusayr in May 2013, culminating in the regime’s successful routing of rebel troops from the town in early June. The fall of al-Qusayr has thus effectively altered the balance of power on the ground and serves as a critical turning point in the civil war.  With control of al-Qusayr, the regime can now strengthen its position in Homs province overall and better position itself to retake areas in the north and the east. Moreover, this regime success demonstrates the degree to which the conflict is no longer limited to Syria, but instead has engulfed the entire region, with troops from neighboring countries, including Lebanese Hezbollah in large numbers, reinforcing the regime's effort, and other regional and foreign fighters supporting the opposition.  To this end, the engagement in al-Qusayr has escalated cross-border operations by both sides.

 

The regime has been fighting for control of Homs province since its major offensive in the city in February 2012. By early May 2012, following a U.N. brokered cease-fire, only sporadic street fighting and shelling occurred in Homs city and the surrounding area. During this time, the government controlled the majority of the city, with the opposition holding less than a fifth of Homs while fighting for control of a similar-sized area was still ongoing. [1]  By mid-December 2012, the Syrian army had regained control of nearly all of the remaining portions of Homs city, except the Old City, Deir Baalba, and Khalidiya districts where rebels continued to hold out under the army’s siege. By the end of the month, government forces had recaptured Deir Baalba as well and were making significant inroads against the remaining rebel-held districts. [2]  In March 2013, the Syrian government hoped to conclusively consolidate its control of the city and launched a major offensive into rebel-held territory. [3] However, thanks to opposition reinforcements that arrived from al-Qusayr, the rebels were able to push back government forces. By mid-March, they launched their own offensive into Bab Amr, attacking numerous government positions within the key district. Heavy fighting ensued. [4] Although it is uncertain how much of Bab Amr the rebels were able to recapture or continue to hold while under intense shelling by the Syrian regime, is was clear that government  forces were struggling to maintain their positions and were at the risk of suffering major setbacks.

 

It was at this time in March 2013 that rebel commanders began reporting increasing numbers of Hezbollah troops in al-Qusayr. Although this was not a new phenomenon, the density of Hezbollah forces openly operating in conjunction with Syrian military forces was unprecedented. The border around al-Qusayr has never officially been settled, and many Shi‘a living in farming villages on the Syrian side of the border hold Lebanese passports. This had initially allowed Hezbollah to justify its activities in the area, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah early on claimed that those fighting near al-Qusayr were individual members of Hezbollah, acting of their own volition and not under party orders. But by October 2012, with the death of a senior commander near al-Qusayr it had become clear that Hezbollah was openly operating in the area under command and control of its leadership.

 

 

Since this time, Hezbollah’s involvement has shifted dramatically. By the end of March and early April 2013, Government forces were in danger of losing critical territory in Homs city. They were only able to hold on and push back against rebel forces due to the support of Hezbollah moving fully into the territory to fight on behalf of the Syrian government with entire units from the Bekaa Valley and Hermel mobilized. Hezbollah forces attacked rebel positions in and around al-Qusayr and reportedly committed a number of massacres in surrounding villages, forcing rebels to send reinforcements to al-Qusayr and stalling their offensive in Homs city.  Hezbollah troops then squeezed rebel positions from the southwest, while the government regained territory in Homs city and pushed in on rebels from the northeast. Effectively, government forces and Hezbollah coordinated to place al-Qusayr under siege and isolate the rebels within the city. [5] Beginning in April, pro-regime forces managed to clear rebels from much of the countryside and isolate the town in order to prevent a rebel withdrawal. Once villages were secured, the surrounding area was subject to a build-up of government troops. Reinforcements for the fight were drawn from units in Daraa and Damascus.  This strategy prevented the arrival of rebel reinforcements, which failed to find a way into the besieged town.  The siege also barred the transfer of weapons to the area. 

 

From this enhanced position, the regime launched a major offensive against al-Qusayr in early May 2013. In this offensive, regime troops combined with guerrilla detachments of Hezbollah and the militia-like National Defense Force. Government forces deployed artillery and airpower against the town, enabling bombardments that weakened rebel positions. Many rebels feared that they would be quickly defeated in the wake of the government offensive. One commander from the opposition al-Haqq Brigade stated, “If we hold our positions through the week it will be a miracle.” [6] Nearly twenty different opposition brigades came together to organize operations and repel the offensive, including the Farouq Brigades, the al-Haqq Brigade, the Mughaweer Battalion, the Wadi Brigades, the Qassioun Battalion, and the Ayman Battalion.  Jabhat al-Nusra has also played a role, although their presence in al-Qusayr has largely been exaggerated in media reporting. In mid-May, it was reported that an important Jabhat al-Nusra commander, Abu Omar, had been killed along with a number of his subordinates. [7] It appears that other rebel groups benefited from the death of Abu Omar by asserting their own leadership, and Jabhat al-Nusra has since played a marginalized role in the fighting with other rebel groups taking the lead.

 

 

Initially, the rebels were able to hold their positions despite the relentless bombardment, and managed to push back Hezbollah troops who took heavy losses during the early stages of the offensive.  The rebel’s success was partly due to a surge in weapons and resources that were smuggled into the town from Lebanon. Commanders from a variety of units were reportedly sending men into Lebanon to stock up on weapons before sending them back through Homs and into the remaining rebel-held neighborhoods before reaching al-Qusayr. Throughout May, the opposition groups in al-Qusayr were aided by a surge in reinforcements, with rebel groups from as far away as Aleppo and al-Raqqa sending forces to aid in the battle.  These reinforcements amassed in areas around Rastan and Talbissa, two important rebel strongholds that have been used as launching points for attacks in Homs and al-Qusayr. Although these reinforcements were largely prevented from entering the town itself, they played a key role in targeting government convoys sending reinforcements and supplies to pro-regime forces. [8]

 

It was not until mid-May that their grasp began to slip on the city and, on May 19^th, Syrian forces stormed al-Qusayr. Although media reports stated that Syrian forces had gained control of al-Qusayr’s city center and managed to retake all but ten percent of the city, rebel commanders denied the reports.  Videos posted online confirmed that rebels continued to hold the city center and much of the northern areas of the city at that time. [9] Fighting continued unabated with both sides consolidating forces in and around the town through May. Rebel groups from across Syria sent units to bolster their defense of al-Qusayr, including the Tawhid Brigade from Aleppo, the Nasr Salahaddin Battalion from al-Raqqa, and the Usra Brigade from Deir al-Zour. In early June, video statements showed that at least some of these reinforcements had managed to enter the city and participate in clashes with regime troops. [10] On the government side, reinforcements from the 3^rd and 4^th Divisions and the Republican Guard were sent from Damascus to provide greater infantry support. Some Damascus activists described a lightened military presence in Damascus as regime troops were sent in greater numbers to al-Qusayr. [11]

 

With the help of Hezbollah troops moving into Hamidiyah, the regime was able to retake the Dabaa military base and gain considerable ground in the southern section of the city by the end of May. From that time, the regime slowly advanced on rebel positions in the city and managed to cut off the majority of rebel supply lines. While conditions were dire for the armed opposition besieged in al-Qusayr, the rebels managed to maintain their positions in the western and northern sections of the city, as well as in key areas of the city center. They also managed to open an important corridor into the city near Shamsin from which they were able to attack government positions.  The rebels proved to be well entrenched in al-Qusayr and aided through fortifications including tunnels.

 

On June 3, government forces heavily bombarded the rebel-controlled northern area of al-Qusayr, leveling row after row of buildings in order to deny rebels cover. Soon after, Hezbollah units carried out a ground assault against the remaining operational opposition forces. This combined attack proved to be the final assault necessary for the regime and Hezbollah forces to force a negotiated withdrawal of rebel fighters, who were running desperately low on weapons and ammunition. Opposition forces were allowed to withdraw from al-Qusayr along a narrow corridor of territory still under their control to reach the villages of Dabaa and Buwaydah al-Sharqiyah. While the Syrian government had formerly prevented the withdrawal of opposition fighters, a Lebanese-brokered agreement between opposition fighters and Hezbollah reportedly paved the way for a rebel withdrawal on the condition that opposition fighters be allowed to evacuate families and wounded people without being attacked. [12] However, fighting has again broken out in these areas along the northern edge of the town where opposition forces continue to retreat, and government forces have been conducting clearance operations to evict the remaining rebel forces. [13]

 

 

Although the regime success in al-Qusayr was quite slow, the well-coordinated offensive proved to be successful in defeating rebels in the town.  The regime demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt its military tactics and strategically evolve in ways that made them much more effective against the insurgency. To add to this, Hezbollah’s efforts shifted the local balance of forces in the area. In combination with regular and irregular regime elements, Hezbollah's contribution remains a key contributor to the rebel defeat. Hezbollah has proven to be much more effective in confronting rebel forces as they have better experience in guerrilla tactics, unlike the ranks of Syria’s conventional army. To this end, Hezbollah has played a key role in the regime's development of effective irregular forces. It reportedly provides training and advice to local militia groups, Popular Committee elements, and the National Defense Army, all of which are playing a growing role in the regime's defense. Many rebel commanders reported that fighting Hezbollah troops was much more difficult than fighting against regime troops because “they are better fighters” and “more professional” than the Syrian army. [14] For his part, Assad acknowledged his debt to the movement, expressing “very high confidence, great satisfaction and appreciation toward Hezbollah” and promising to “give them everything.” [15]

 

Fighting in al-Qusayr revealed a new regime approach to fighting its insurgency.  The Syrian government showed that it can use Hezbollah fighters, and possibly Iraqi and Iranian fighters, as a reliable infantry force alongside its own heavy weapons and airpower. The regime displayed a sophisticated level of operations which included heavy preparatory bombardment followed by the infiltration of irregular allied units, and finally armor-supported infantry attacks. The three phases of this strategy were jointly achieved through the coordination of separate chains of command, a difficult task under the best of circumstances. That the regime was able to cooperate so closely with Hezbollah leadership in combining regular, irregular, and allied units with separate functions speaks to the close nature of the relationship between the Syrian government and Hezbollah. The battle in al-Qusayr is unique in its proximity to Lebanon and the presence of so many Shi‘a Lebanese villages in the area, giving Hezbollah an edge in the fighting. Nevertheless, their increased involvement in battlefronts across Syria will be a critical boost to the regime.  Over time, the replenishment of the regime's forces could allow Assad to rest and redeploy some of his forces for operations elsewhere in Syria, including efforts to retake certain rebel-held areas in the north and the east. This would give the regime renewed offensive and defensive capabilities and greater resources.

 

However, it should be noted that mobilizing militia units drawn primarily from Alawi and Shi‘a populations has its drawbacks. Command and control of these irregular forces will likely become increasingly difficult, and the Syrian government’s ability to control them may deteriorate over time. Already, the fact that Hezbollah helped negotiate a withdrawal despite the regime’s initial decision to prevent one suggests the likelihood of future disagreements over strategy and objective. Moreover, while there are clear short-term benefits, this mobilization also produces greater sectarian polarization and thus threatens the support Assad receives by critical portions of the Sunni community. This type of strategy was avoided by former president Hafez al-Assad who was clearly aware of the dangers of relying solely on minority groups. He was careful to downplay sectarian rhetoric and sought to build cross-sectarian patronage networks as part of the regime’s embedded authoritarianism, which ultimately contributed to the regime’s staying power.   Losing Sunni support and relying on minority-drawn militias could put the regime in a vulnerable position, and it is unclear whether the government could then muster the manpower and support needed to reclaim lost territory.

 

As the conflict in Syria has protracted, the Assad regime has had time to reconsolidate and renew its offensive capability through an increased reliance on irregular forces and allied resources and support. This support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah has exceeded the amount of support going to the opposition, and has meant that the regime is far better resourced than its opponents.  As the regime has adapted its strategy to match changing conditions, rebel forces have been unable to effectively respond. This is partly due to command and organizational issues that make it difficult to concentrate and coordinate significant forces, but it is also due to the lack of supplies, including much-needed ammunition, as well as their inability to withstand airpower. Overall, the opposition simply lacks the means for more effective resistance in the face of heavy bombardment by regime air power and artillery. This vulnerability was evident in al-Qusayr, where air power impeded resupply efforts and inflicted losses on opposition forces.

 

Although al-Qusayr may not be the decisive battle for Syria, it should be seen as an important turning point. By reasserting its military superiority in al-Qusayr, the regime has gained momentum, and through the help of Hezbollah and Iranian forces, it will likely be able to consolidate its control over the areas it now holds. This includes Syria’s most populated and economically important districts. Control of these areas will facilitate their advance on areas north of Homs province and possibly allow them to reclaim important rebel-held areas in the north and the east. Moreover, the regime victory effectively cuts off an important supply route to the rebels which will leave the armed opposition in an ever more weakened position. As for now, the regime does not have the forces required to move on from al-Qusayr and advance on other areas in the north. This means that the rebels have a brief window while the regime resets its capabilities. This window may permit them to develop a counteroffensive in order to disrupt the regime’s opportunity to capitalize upon its victory at al-Qusayr. However, the past performance of the armed opposition creates doubt over its ability to so. In light of the regime’s regained strategic and operational initiative, it will be even more difficult for the opposition moving forward.

 

This victory has also put the Syrian government in a better position as it enters the upcoming summit in Geneva. It is now able to transform its military advances into a stronger negotiating position, and there is now little pressure for Assad to bargain in good faith. His gains could even embolden Assad to push for all-out military victory rather than participate in the peace talks being promoted by the United States and Russia. This portends the failure of the summit and an end to international efforts to resolve the conflict through negotiations. If the international community truly seeks to enforce a negotiated settlement, they will have to do something to decisively change the balance of power on the ground ahead of the negotiations.

 

The battle for al-Qusayr symbolizes the conflict’s transformation into a regional imbroglio that can no longer be isolated within the Syrian context. Since the fall of the town, rebel fighters have already promised to take the fight to Hezbollah in Lebanon, launching over 18 rockets into Baalbek in a single day. [16] This has had a major impact on furthering sectarian polarization spilling over into Lebanon and Iraq, and exacerbating the role of identity politics and sectarianism in the region as a whole. While the defeat in al-Qusayr should not be seen as the decisive battle for Syria or as a forecast of regime victory, it does represent a new stage in the conflict through the open involvement of Hezbollah and Iranian forces at the side of the regime. That the regime was able to execute such an operation at this stage of the war testifies to its resilience and adaptability, and, more importantly, to the unswerving support of its allies Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. The support of these countries will allow for Assad to continue his military onslaught, while the lack of a decision to reinforce the opposition with the necessary resources ensures the rebels’ inferiority on the battlefield and will ultimately result in the death of the Geneva negotiations.  

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[1] Lyse Doucet, “Homs: a scarred and divided city,” BBC, May 9, 2012.

[2] Alison Tahmizian Meuse, “Syrian troops hit Homs, kill 23 children,” The Australian, December 30, 2012.

[3] “Syria rebels capture northern Raqqa city,” Al-Jazeera, March 5, 2013.

[4] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook Page, March 10, 2013.

[5] Interviews with Syrian rebels conducted via Skype in March, April 2013 and in person in Istanbul in May 2013.

[6] Interview with commander of Liwa al-Haq in al-Qusayr, conducted via Skype on May 3, 2013.

[7] Jim Kouri, “Islamists suffer setback in Syria with killing of al-Qaeda linked leader,” The Examiner, May 22, 2013.

[8] Interviews with rebel commanders in May 2013.

[9] “Al-Qusayr, Homs, Colonel Abdel Jabaar al-Iqaydi,” YouTube, June 2, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2b6gRQ8_BI; interviews with commanders in May 2013.

[10] “Al-Qusayr, Homs, Colonel Abdel Jabaar al-Iqaydi;” interviews with commanders in May 2013.

[11] Interviews with Syrian commanders and activists in May 2013; Jeffrey White, “The Qusayr Rules: The Syrian Regime’s Changing Way of War,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 31, 2013. 

[12] Saleh Hodaife, “Rebel withdrawal from al-Qusayr result of deal with Hezbollah,” NOW Lebanon, June 5, 2013.

[13] “Syria army deals severe blow to rebels in key town,” AP, June 5, 2013.

[14] Interviews with Syrian rebels conducted via Skype in March 2013.

[15] Liz Sly, “Assad forces gaining ground in Syria,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2013.

[16] “Syrian rockets hit Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon, influential cleric fans sectarian flames,” AP, June 1, 2013. 

 

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

Wednesday Hero - 1st Lt. Nathan M. Krissoff

This Post Was Suggested By Cindy

1st Lt. Nathan M. Krissoff 25 years old from Reno, Nevada Headquarters and Service Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force December 9, 2006



Nathan Krissoff enlisted in the Marine Corps. after the attacks on Sept. 11 out of a sense of duty to his country. 1st. Lt. Krissoff was killed in 2006 when his convoy was hit by an IED in al-Amariyah, Iraq. He was posthumously awarded a Purple Heart.

On Memorial Day his family shared some of his letters that he wrote to them while deployed.

These brave men and women sacrifice so much in their lives just so others may get to enjoy freedom. For that I am proud to call them Hero.

Those Who Say That We're In A Time When There Are No Heroes, They Just Don't Know Where To Look

This post is part of the Wednesday Hero Blogroll. For more information about Wednesday Hero, or if you would like to post it on your site, you can go here.

2013 Iraq Update #22: Iraq's sectarian crisis reignites as Shi'a militias execute civilians and remobilize

By Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War

View our 2013 Iraq Updates online. 

Escalating violence in Iraq crossed a new and very dangerous threshold this week.  Al Qaeda in Iraq launched a concentrated wave of car-bomb and other attacks specifically against civilian Shi'a targets in and around Baghdad.  Shi'a militias are mobilizing and have begun a round of sectarian killings facilitated by false checkpoints, a technique characteristic of the 2006-2007 period.  Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has taken a number of steps to demonstrate that he remains in control of the situation.  The expansion of Shi'a militia activity, however, is likely to persuade many Iraqis that he is either not in control or is actively abetting the killings.  The re-mobilization of Shi'a militias in Iraq coincides with the formal announcement by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah of his organization's active military participation in the Syrian civil war.  Al Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian mass-murder attacks coincide with the announcement by AQI's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, that attacking Hezbollah is that group's primary target henceforth.  The stage appears to be set not merely for the collapse of the Iraqi state into the kind of vicious sectarian killing and sectarian cleansing that nearly destroyed it in 2006 and 2007, but also for the expansion of that sectarian warfare throughout both Mesopotamia and the Levant.

Sectarian violence has escalated sharply in Iraq. On Monday, May 27, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a coordinated operation to target Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad with numerous and large vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs). This operation followed a wave of VBIED attacks on May 20 that targeted the lines of communication into Baghdad and some Shi‘a populations across Iraq. An estimated 212 people have died in violent attacks in Iraq since May 20, and another 624 have been injured. May’s casualties are thus likely to surpass April’s, which had made that month the most violent in Iraq since 2008. Most of these attacks, especially VBIEDs and suicide attacks, conform to the methods usually attributed to AQI. Additional reports from Baghdad and Diyala also indicate that Shi‘a militant groups, including the Iranian-backed Sadrist splinter group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have begun to mobilize in Iraq to establish checkpoints in Baghdad and to conduct extra-judicial killings (EJKs) against Sunnis. Extra-judicial killings reportedly carried out by militias also occurred in the city of Hilla in central Iraq. AAH, along with Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, publically acknowledged its military involvement in Syria in April 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah has mobilized in Syria throughout May. This regional military activation, as well as the elevated threat to the Iraqi Shi‘a population posed by AQI, lends greater credibility to the reports that Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups have mobilized to conduct intimidation and violence against Sunni in the name of defending Shi’a populations.

AQI’s 2013 VBIED Campaign

Violent attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) escalated sharply in April and May. AQI has maneuvered among anti-government protests and Iraqi Security Force deployments to project attacks throughout Iraq, most prominently in Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Vehicle-borne improvised-explosive devices (VBIEDs) are re-emerging as a primary attack type, reverting to a trend first seen as the sectarian civil war expanded in 2006. In particular, the two waves of VBIED attacks on May 20 and May 27 demonstrate a concerted effort by AQI to exacerbate sectarian tensions and escalate violence, to fix Iraqi security forces in certain positions and drive them from others, to gain freedom of movement along lines of communication, and to set conditions for deliberate targeting of neighborhoods that were prime locations for sectarian violence in 2006-7. AQI conducted a campaign in July 2012 (under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq) that focused on Iraqi government officials, security forces, Sahwa (Awakening) leaders, and Shi‘a civilians in order to limit the reach and effectiveness of Maliki’s government and to regain lost territory. Since that time, AQI has conducted attacks using IEDs, suicide bombers, armed clashes, assassinations, and coordinated simultaneous explosions.  The recent waves differ both in the number of VBIEDs used simultaneously and in the specific targeting of Shi’a civilians in known sectarian hot-spots.

The concentration of VBIED attacks in late May 2013 demonstrates AQI’s capacity to stage in the locations around the outskirts of Baghdad (the Baghdad belt) from which it had launched attacks in 2006-7, to procure the components necessary to build VBIEDs in large numbers, and to project force into Shi‘a communities and mixed areas within Baghdad. Moreover, the campaign has deliberately escalated violence and selected targets to shape not only the perceptions of Iraqi Sunnis, but also those of Iraqi Shi‘a, who may begin to lose faith in the Maliki government if attacks are allowed to continue.

GRAPHIC 1 | VBIED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, 20 AND 27 MAY 2013

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 20

A wave of 11 VBIED attacks and seven additional explosions struck urban centers across Iraq on Monday, May 20 resulting in at least 60 deaths and 178 injuries. Two other VBIEDs were defused before they could explode on their targets. Six of the VBIEDs detonated in predominantly Shi‘a neighborhoods along the periphery of Baghdad city. These events, depicted on the map above, accounted for a small percentage of the total casualties on that day, yielding one death and 21 injuries. The low casualties may indicate AQI’s difficulty entering Shi‘a neighborhoods to hit prime targets. In light of the wave of attacks a week later that did hit such targets, however, it is more likely that AQI was using the first series of attacks to establish access routes into Baghdad and test its ability to synchronize operations. The neighborhoods chosen represent the outer rim of Shi‘a communities in Baghdad that are most easily accessible from main supply routes and proximate Sunni neighborhoods. The attacks collectively illustrate a campaign to attack a very selective target set just inside the city rim.

Other VBIEDs on May 20 in the cities of Basra, Mahmoudiyah, Wasit, Hilla, Balad, Samarra, and Baiji, accounted for the majority of the casualties. The most lethal attack occurred in Hilla city, Babel Province, where two car bombs exploded in a market near the Shi’a Wardiya mosque, killing 22 and wounding 77. Targeting of religious sites clearly indicates AQI’s intent to elicit a sectarian response, particularly given the centrality of the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 to the subsequent mobilization of Shi‘a  militias for sectarian combat. Additionally, the car bomb in Balad on May 20 targeted a bus full of Iranian pilgrims bound for the Shrine of Imam Mohammed, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. This incident, along with another attack on Iranian pilgrims at the Samarra mosque on May 25, feed into the justifications being proffered by Shi’a fighting groups in support of their activities.  Key figures within Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have used these attacks recently as rallying cries to defend holy sites. Iran has also responded to previous attacks by launching probes into the deaths of pilgrims in Iraq. Iran’s Director General of the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization in charge of Holy Sites Masoud Akhavan announced in December 2012 that Iranian security companies were escorting Iranian pilgrims into Iraq. This practice may also be a vehicle by which Iran could funnel IRGC-QF augmentation into Iraq, for which there is historical precedent.  It also explains AQI’s focused targeting of these pilgrims.

Comparing the VBIED attacks on May 20 to concurrent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) and adhesive explosive devices (AED), the VBIEDs were used to target large numbers of civilians, while IEDs and AEDs were often used for targeted killings or attacks against security force patrols or members of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Samarra VBIED on May 20 targeted Sahwa as they gathered to receive their salaries. VBIEDs have also been used in 2013 to target ISF at security checkpoints, but in May 2013 they have largely been used to target Shi‘a civilians.

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 27

Two days after Iraqi security forces moved to conduct operations in western Anbar, AQI launched a second wave of 13 VBIEDS and one additional explosion on May 27 that killed 36 and wounded 147. This time, all 14 attacks occurred in the vicinity of Baghdad, indicating a deliberate shift to focus upon the capital region. Within Baghdad, the map above demonstrates a geographic shift from the periphery to the center, in particular to neighborhoods at the heart of the sectarian strife in 2006-7 such as Saadoun (in Rusafa), Khadimiya, Huriya, Saadriya (in central Karkh), and Shaab (just outside of Sadr City). Attacks in Habbibiyah in Sadr City may also be meant to show the government and Shi‘a militant groups that AQI can attack even into the heart of their territory.

AQI’s ability to plan and execute 13 simultaneous VBIED attacks at strategically selected sites within Baghdad is also noteworthy. VBIEDs are among the most expensive and complex improvised weapons systems, capable of achieving massive effects in isolation, and often historically reserved for that purpose. The use of so many VBIEDs in a single day demonstrates a high degree of technical and organizational skill and suggests the ability to produce VBIEDs in large numbers and rapidly.  It indicates the dramatic extent to which AQI appears to have recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in 2007 and 2008.

AQI attacks did not slow after May 27, moreover. Attacks have continued over the last three days, including six more VBIEDs in the vicinity of Baghdad, and one in particular against a wedding in Jihad on May 30 that claimed 20 casualties. Jihad is another predominantly Shi‘a neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad that was heavily contested in 2006-7, and sufficiently Shi’ified through migrations and extra-judicial killings that it supported Moqtada al Sadr in the Baghdad Uprising in 2008. This attack occurred one day after a VBIED attack in the market of Jihad, which killed 16 and wounded 45. Cumulatively, these two events claimed the greatest number of casualties over the last ten days.

Shi‘a Militant Response
The recent bombing waves in Baghdad have gripped residents with fear of sectarian war. Their sentiments are reminiscent of the atmosphere that engulfed the city in 2006 as broader conflict loomed.  As a result of the deteriorating security in Baghdad, commercial activity in the city has been declining.   Social media posts and isolated reports have been circulating since the beginning of the week that Iraqi Shi‘a militias, primarily Asai’b Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), have been patrolling streets of Baghdad, setting up “false checkpoints,” and conducting extra-judicial killings against Sunnis. Residents have been expressing fear of extra-judicial killings since early May. The evidence is clear; Shi’a militants have mobilized in Baghdad and are conducting executions of civilians.

                                                      

GRAPHIC 2 | SHI'A MILITANT ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD IN MAY 2013

Several attacks over recent days bore the signature of Shi’a militant groups. On 28 May, the bodies of two university students were found in northern Baghdad in Agarguf area of the Mansour District with hands bound behind them, shot in the chest and head. They had been thrown from an unmarked vehicle according to witnesses who also noted that false checkpoints had been set up in the same area. Agarguf area was used by Shi’a militant groups to dump hundreds of bodies in 2007. Three people had been kidnapped by armed persons in an unmarked vehicle on the evening of 26 May at al-Mu’atham bus stop in central Baghdad, which is frequently used by students. It is possible that these events, both involving signature tactics of Shi’a militant groups, had the same victims. Additionally, on 26 May, armed persons wearing police uniforms invaded a home in al-Za’franiya in southeast Baghdad, dragging the owner outside and shooting him. The method of attack and geographic location correspond with historical patterns of Shi’a militancy and make attribution to Sunni terrorist groups implausible. Sunni mosques were also attacked in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Mansour and Saydiyah and twice in Diyala province, which clearly points to Shi‘a militancy.

Morality policing executions have also been reported in areas of Baghdad just outside of Sadr City. On 14 May, unidentified armed men attacked a police checkpoint in Zayunah, handcuffing security personnel but leaving them unharmed. Afterwards, the same gunmen traveling in an SUV raided five liquor stores and killed 12 people. A week later, on 22 May, unidentified armed men attacked a brothel in Zayunah and killed five men, five women, the owner, and his wife with silenced weapons and knives. Also on 22 May, unidentified armed men travelling in a car shot a liquor shop owner while driving near a market in al-Shaab, in northeast Baghdad. Zayuna and al-Shaab are predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, and militia activity there most likely indicates the militia’s intent to re-establish control.

Additionally, several assassinations this week fit patterns of violence historically characteristic of Shi’a militant groups. On 26 May, the imam of the al-Qadisiyah Mosque was attacked by unidentified armed men with silenced weapons while driving in Diyala Province. The same day, unidentified armed individuals shot a policeman in al-Waziriyah, in the northeast quadrant of Baghdad, again using silenced weapons, and a primary school teacher was killed with silenced weapons in al-Qahirah, a neighboring area in the northeast of Baghdad. On 27 May, another teacher was shot with silenced weapons near the militia stronghold of Khalis in Diyala. Additionally, in an assassination that drew more public attention to this rise in targeted killings, Abbas Ja’far, the brother of a famous soccer player, was shot on 25 May by two armed men on a motorcycle outside his home in Habibiyah, a neighborhood in eastern Baghdad abutting Sadr City. Two other attacks involved drive-by shootings of civilians in Jisr Diyala in southeast Baghdad, one a civilian as he was leaving his home, and another the owner of a grocery store. Other variants of these militia signature attacks included the killing of four civilians as they exited a taxi in al-Kadhimiyah, north of Baghdad, and the killing of two owners of a goldsmith shop in al-Mashtal, on the rim of southeast Baghdad. Some of these instances clearly demonstrate sectarian violence because they hit obviously Sunni targets. Others, in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad, instead demonstrate intra-Shi’a violence.

Other attacks likely conducted by Iraqi Shi‘a militias can be detected by method and by target. The most recent target set has included cafés, where larger groups congregate. They include an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a café in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya on April 18 that killed 27 people. Another café attack took place in Baghdad in the nearby Jamia neighborhood on May 5 (killing or wounding 15 people) and another on May 29 in the Hib Hib area in Diyala province that resulted in 22 people killed and wounded. While these attacks have not been clearly attributed, they differ from attacks customarily attributed to AQI, such as car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks against Iraqi Shi‘a targets. These attacks all took place in predominantly Iraqi Sunni locales. In four of them, IEDs were used; in the fifth, the attack on the Ihsan mosque in Mansour, was conducted by hand grenades. On May 31, police sources in Babil revealed that gunmen killed four people in Hilla. The sources describe the gunmen as traveling with impunity and using silenced weapons, killing former members of the Baath party and one shop owner in Hilla—again, hallmarks of Shi’a militia rather than AQI activity. This comes one week after the VBIED attack upon a Shi’a mosque there.

It is conceivable that AQI has conducted these attacks to instigate retaliatory violence. Their divergence from AQI’s attack methods and their locations, however, make it much more likely that they are reprisal attacks by Shi‘a militant groups. The widespread perception among the public that Shi’a militias conducted these attacks is a major driver and amplifier of fear among the population.

AAH has been in the in the spotlight of renewed militant and political activities since April 2013. The group itself confirmed its role and participation in military activities in Syria along with other Shi‘a groups. Moreover, and in a major projection of force and political prominence, AAH organized a massive, campaign-style rally in Baghdad on May 4. The event was held in a government-owned soccer stadium in Baghdad, the Sina’a Club Stadium on the border of Sadr City, and was ostensibly to celebrate the 10^th anniversary of the group. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are reported to have attended. Photos of the gathering reveal the presence of AAH’s senior leadership, parades, large attendance, tribal figures, and sophisticated organizational capabilities. During the event, AAH’s intentions and capabilities for increased activity were made clear. AAH leader, Qais Al-Khazali, called on members of “the resistance across the spectrum” to maintain readiness and warned politicians who are connected to “regional agendas” that they will be pursued regardless of whether they are “in fortified areas, secured hotels, or armored vehicles.” The resistance is the title used by AAH to describe itself, as well as the word Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahi leaders use referring to the “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies. Al-Khazali also urged anti-government protesters to refrain from sectarian slogans and to reject the killing of ISF members. Those statements came under attack by some Iraqi politicians who also condemned the government for allowing the event to happen. AAH ability to hold events in government-owned facilities is attributed to its relations with Maliki. He has welcomed them into the political process and views them as a countervailing force against the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, from which the group split in 2004.

Spread of “false checkpoints”

Since 2007, Baghdad’s security procedures have incorporated a vast network of street checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members. The purpose of those checkpoints is to look for car bombs and capture wanted individuals. Reports describing “false checkpoints” suggest that some are not manned by ISF members, but instead by personnel in civilian clothes who may or not be security officials. Reportedly, these checkpoints have been inspecting identification cards and inquiring about the sectarian affiliation of passengers. There are also reports that the militias have kidnapped and killed people based on their identity and that the targeting has primarily been of Iraqi Sunnis. The areas where those checkpoints are reported to have operated are concentrated in western Baghdad, which has neighborhoods that are mixed between Iraqi Shi‘a and Iraqi Sunnis.

This way of operating closely echoes events in 2006-7, during which Shi’a militia groups established checkpoints in Baghdad at which they stopped cars, checked identification cards, and kidnapped and then executed Sunnis. They manned those checkpoints either in militia garb or dressed as Iraqi Security Forces. In 2006, the ISF was infiltrated by these militias and tolerated such checkpoints within sight of their official locations or operated them.

Further reports surfaced on May 30 detailing that individuals in civilian clothes have been present at multiple official Baghdad checkpoints; the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior described the individuals as “belonging to formation within the Ministry of Interior.” The MoI spokesperson added that the ministry relies on members from intelligence or other departments who are sometimes tasked with verifying identification cards. According to the same report and citing an unnamed senior security source, militias have been active in both the Rusafa and Karkh sections of Baghdad, but the report asserted that talks of false checkpoints are "exaggerated and intended to spread an atmosphere of fear among citizens.” Despite the explanation offered by MoI, the presence of civilian-clothed individuals is bound to stoke the fears of populations that encounter such checkpoints. It may, indeed, feed speculation that the MoI has become re-infiltrated by militias or is itself engaging in sectarian violence.

Allegations of militia reactivation in Baghdad have been emerging since early May. On May 8, just four days after the AAH parade in the soccer stadium, Iraqiyya issued a statement condemning the government for tolerating rhetoric and threats from Iraqi Shi‘a militias, including AAH, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), and the Mokhtar Army (an Iraqi Hezbollah unit which was formed in February 2013). Iraqiyya posited that statements from these militias are “directly or indirectly tied to those events that resulted in the death of innocent youth.” Iraqiyya may have been referring to increased attacks on cafes where youth congregate.

On May 21, Muqtada Al-Sadr, issued a statement in which he urged followers to “ostracize extremism and what is issued from some of those who belong to Wahhabism or what is issued by some Shi‘a militias.” With this statement, Sadr attempted to take the middle ground in condemning Sunni extremist groups while also criticizing Shi‘a groups. Sadr’s critique of groups like AAH is natural. They are rivals and they compete over turf in Baghdad and elsewhere in southern Iraq. Their rivalry is two-fold, as the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, views himself as the heir to Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr stands to lose if AAH mobilizes while the Sadrist Trend does not. AAH is also the Sadrists’ primary political, military, and increasingly social competitor; this competition is very likely to continue in the future.

The Iraqi government has made a number of announcements to reassure the public and assuage its fears. The cabinet announced on May 28 that it will “pursue all types of militias and firmly strike anybody who violates public order.” Additionally, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited the areas in western Baghdad where most militia activities are reported to have taken place. He inspected checkpoints in Jihad, Amriyya, Mansour, Adel, Huriyya, Kadhimiyah, Taji, and Al-Adhamiyah on May 29. His deputy, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, visited the Saydiyah area on the same day. These are the mixed areas where much of the sectarian violence occurred in 2006-7 and where the public is most concerned about militia activities. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) denied the presence of false checkpoints and urged citizens to contact authorities with information regarding their presence. The Baghdad Operations Center, which absorbed ISF headquarters in Rusafa (East Baghdad) and Karkh (West Baghdad) last week, announced a travel ban for all unregistered vehicles starting at 0600 on Friday, May 31.  Vehicles without license plates have been cited in reports of kidnapping and executions.

Maliki has recently ordered a major shift of key leaders across the security sector, ostensibly in response to heightened security concerns. Those major changes may signal his lack of confidence in their leadership for the security of Baghdad. The leadership changes might also have been a prerequisite for moving trusted leaders into vital positions in the provinces, where Maliki had begun to conduct more aggressive offensive operations after the Hawija incident. Such a hypothesis would seem more plausible if former trusted leaders emerge in new positions, and some of them have. It is also likely that Maliki’s recent restructure of Iraqi Security Force leadership heralds a new security strategy for Baghdad. It is not clear what new strategy he might have intended, but he has at this point either tolerated the mobilization of militias or lost control of their activities in Baghdad.

The possible reactivation of militias poses a serious challenge for him as a security breakdown in Baghdad will be seen as a major setback to ISF and the prime minister. Maliki has hitherto been able to isolate Baghdad from the protesting provinces. The large range of AQI and the reemergence of the militias links the violence in the capital and the provinces in ways he will not likely control. In that light, Maliki’s strategic embrace of AAH in 2012 in order to limit Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence may backfire in 2013. Muqtada may be marginalized, but so too may be Maliki.

And there is evidence that Muqtada is losing control of his militias as well.  In a significant development, a  member of the Sadrist trend office in Mahmudiyah organized a parade. The date of the parade is not known but on May 30 Muqtada Al-Sadr warned his followers to refrain from any action “that reignites sectarianism” and declared that organizing parades is his sole responsibility.  He further disowned the actions of the organizer, Karim Al-Araji, and stated that Araji acted independently. The Mahmudiyah event carries a number of implications. It is a mixed area in the Baghdad belt and since 2006 has continued to be on the fault line of sectarian tensions. The parade suggests that, with reports emerging about militia activation, organizers perceived a need to project force to compete with reported activities by AAH. They may have acted independently of Sadr’s control but his statement demonstrates that he is concerned about ceding ground to AAH’s mobilization. For AAH, discontented members of the Sadrist trend would be prime recruitment targets that could significantly enhance the capabilities of the group.     

For its part, AAH has denied involvement in operations in Baghdad. Its spokesperson, Ahmed Al-Kanani, stated with regard to false checkpoints that AAH “in cooperation with the security apparatus investigated the news of a false checkpoint in Al-Liqa Square in Iskan and other areas in Baghdad, but did not find any trace of them.” AAH’s political bureau chief, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi added on May 30 that the group is not involved in any activities, but warned that the current conditions are similar to the ones that appeared in 2006. Al-Dulaimi emphasized that AAH “is ready for it [mobilization] and we are ready to protect our people.”

Despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces and AAH’s ostensible transition to a socio-religious and political role, AAH has remained an active militant group that did not disarm. Moreover, as the group has been playing an active role in the Abu Al-Fadhel Al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB) in Syria, with responsibility to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, AAH has been activated for battle since 2012. This mobilization for Syria reduces the obstacles to taking up arms in Iraq.

AAH has overtly linked the conflict in Syria to the one in Iraq. According to AAH’s political deputy Al-Dulaimi, “The Sayyeda Zeinab shrine has had symbolic importance for Muslims all over the world and the targeting of this shrine by Takfiri extremists will result in a disaster, because an attack on it will be followed by a similar attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra. An attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra will inflame the sectarian crisis in Iraq.” The line of argument serves AAH well by justifying mobilization in both Syria and Iraq.

Dulaimi stated in the same interview that “[AAH] is alongside Iraq’s security forces and emphasizes the existing political process in this country.” With the escalation of attacks by AQI, it is also increasingly likely that AAH and other Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups will perceive the need to defend predominately Iraqi Shi‘a areas throughout Iraq; and in Baghdad especially. Attacks against Iraqi civilians have continued despite the efforts of Iraqi Security Forces to contain them. In 2006, when ISF was unable to contain the civil war in Baghdad and Diyala, Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups mobilized to provide protection. Although the ISF's capabilities have vastly improved since 2006, the continuation of AQI attacks in Baghdad will reduce the confidence of the population and set conditions for the return of Iraqi Shi‘a militias as defenders of the Shi’a.

AAH mobilization in Baghdad comes as other Iranian-backed groups have increased their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made two visits to Tehran in April, the first to meet with IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the second to meet Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Afterwards, Nasrallah admitted his fighters’ involvement in Syria, announced that “Hezbollah could become more deeply involved in the future,” and said that Syria had “real friends” who would aid it. He further stated that there would be “very serious repercussions” if the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab was destroyed or damaged. This announcement was concurrent with Hezbollah’s sending of numerous reinforcements, probably more than two thousand, to assist regime forces in besieging the strategically important town of Qusayr.

In Qusayr, Hezbollah met fierce resistance, with estimates of over 50 militants killed in action between May 18-21. On May 24, 75 fighters had been reported killed to that point in the month. The next day, Nasrallah officially signaled his “undying loyalty” to the Syrian regime; this shift in rhetoric is notable, from a commitment primarily to defending Lebanese civilians in Syria and religious sites using veiled language to an explicit and overt commitment to defending the Syrian regime.

Compounding Hezbollah’s official commitment to the ongoing Syrian civil war, the group has come into direct conflict with Sunni-oriented extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organization, announced on May 15 that targeting Hezbollah would be their top priority. Jabhat al-Nusra has also clashed with the Abu Fadl al-Abbas (AFAB) brigade, which is a Shi‘a Syrian militant group affiliated AAH. AFAB and AAH, like Hezbollah, are all Iranian-linked militant organizations. This signals a broadening conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a militant groups expanding across the Iraqi and Syrian fronts.

Iraqis, and particularly the people of Baghdad, have proven resilient in the face of violence since 2008, but their reaction to increased attacks and the news of Iraqi Shi‘a militias resurgence indicate genuine concern. The overt mobilization of Iraqi Shi‘a militias has already included: public military parades, increased inflammatory and threatening rhetoric, leaflets and night letters dropped demanding the departure of Iraqi Sunnis, assassination of local Sunni clerics, and possible retaliatory attacks that target Iraqi Sunni areas. If AAH has mobilized, other Iraqi Shi‘a militias like KH and Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade will feel pressured to take part in order to burnish their credentials as protectors of the Iraqi Shi‘a, which could escalate quickly to sectarian war, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.